SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Justice Doraiswamy Raju & Justice Arijit Pasayat
Dr.B.Singh
vs. Union of India.
Reported in 2004 AIRSCW 1494.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.
This petition filed purportedly under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
1950 (in short the "Constitution") shows to what extent the process of law can
be abused. It carries the attractive brand name of "public interest
litigation", but the least that can be said is that it smacks of everything
what a public interest litigation should not be.
2. The petition is purposed to have been filed questioning the propriety as a
Judge. Subsequently, an application was filed for permission to withdraw the
petition with liberty to file a fresh petition as in the meantime respondent
No. 3 has been appointed as a Judge.
3. Before we go into the desirability of even entertaining such a petition,
background in which the petition has been filed needs to be noticed.
4. According to the petitioner, as reflected in the petition, basis of the
petition is a copy of the representation purported to have been received from
one Ram Sarup which was addressed to the President of India with copies to the
Chief Justice of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Chief Justice of Punjab
and Haryana High Court, Governor of Haryana and Bar Council or India wherein
allegations were made against respondent No. 3. Only on the basis of what is
stated therein of which apparently the petitioner himself cannot legitimately
claim to have any personal knowledge the petitioner filed a writ petition
before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was dismissed. The petitioner
makes a grievance that aforesaid Ram Sarup had received acknowledgement of the
representation addressed to the President of India wherein it was also noted
that the same had been forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Legal Affairs) for
appropriate action. But no action was taken to look into the allegations. It
is not clear from the writ petition as to whether the petitioner had sent any
representation to the President and other constitutional functionaries as the
enclosures to the writ petition show that aforesaid Ram Sarup had sent
representations to the President with copies to the other functionaries. The
copy of the representation dated 18.10.2003 shows that it was sent by Ram
Sarup. The second representation is dated 13.12.2003 in which reference has
been made to a representation purported to be dated 28.11.203. In the
representation dated 13.12.2003 references is made to the acknowledgement
dated 12.11.2003. This creates an impression that the acknowledgement dated
12.11.2003, or the President’s Secretariat relates to the representations sent
by Ram Sarup. But the copy of purported acknowledgement filed as Annexure P-2
shows as if it was sent by the petitioner. No copy of any representation dated
28.10.2003 as indicated in Annexure P-2 has been filed along with the
petition. The petitioner nowhere has stated that he has any personal knowledge
of the allegations made against respondent No. 3. He does not even aver that
he made any effort to find out whether the allegations have any basis. He only
refers to the representation of Ram Sarup and some paper cuttings of news
items. He has not indicated as to whether he was aware of the authenticity or
otherwise of the news items. It is too much to attribute authenticity or
credibility to any information or fact merely because, it found publication in
a newspaper or journal or Magazine or any other form of communication, as
though it is gospel truth. It needs no reiteration that newspaper reports per
se do not constitute legally acceptable evidence. Strangely, in the affidavit
accompanying the writ petition he has stated as follows:
"That I have read over the contents of accompanying writ petition page No. 1
to 13 para, Para No. 1 to 18, synopsis and list of dates, page A to C and I
say that the same are true and correct on knowledge and based on the record of
the case".
The affidavit shows that the contents were true and correct to his knowledge
and based on records. Strangely, it has not been indicated as to what is the
source of his knowledge and are based on what records. Even the copy of the
order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court where he filed writ
application on allegedly identical issues, as indicated in the petition, has
not been annexed. The casual and cavalier fashion it appears to have been
handled and of late attempted to be made ipse dixit, in a laconic and
lackadaisical manner compels to draw the only inference that the petitioner is
a busy bent upon self publicity sans any sense of responsibility unmindful of
the adverse impact, at times it may go to create at the expense of decency and
dignity of constitutional offices and functionaries and there is no element or
even trace of public interest involved in the petition.
When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest
litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes or vendatta
to bring to terms a person, not of ones liking, or gain publicity or a facade
for blackmail., said petition has to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the
issues involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the
issue regarding the "public interest" aspect. Public Interest Litigation which
has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should
not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or
"politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation".
It is not properly and strictly regulated at least in certain vital areas or
spheres and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to
release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well to malign not only an incumbent
to be in office but demoralise and deter reasonable or sensible and prudent
people even agreeing to accept highly sensitive and responsible offices for
fear of being brought into disrepute with baseless allegations. There must be
real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and concrete or
credible basis for maintaining a cause before court and not merely an
adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be
invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their persons
causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice
should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to
the extraordinary jurisdiction. The credibility of such claims of litigations
should be adjudged on the creditworthiness of the materials. Averred and not
even on the credentials claimed of the person moving the courts in such cases.
A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of
public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the
Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of
statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political
motive or any oblique, consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this
Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. (1992 (4) SCC 305) and Kazi
Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation. (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A
writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come
not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean
heart, clean mind and clean objective. See Ramjas Foundation vs. Union of
India, (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R. Srinivas vs. R.M. Premchand, (1994 (6) SCC
620).
5. It is necessary to take not of the meaning of expression ‘public interest
litigation’. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), "Public
Interest" is defined thus :-
"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that
which is interesting as gratifying curiosity of a love of information or
amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary
interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
affected."
6. In Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as
follows:
"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which
their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the
particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question.
Interest shared by national government........"
7. In Janata Dal’s case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public
interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what
is public interest, has laid down as follows:
"The expression ‘litigation’ means a legal action including all proceedings
therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a
remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means the legal action
initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest of general
interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary
interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
affected."
8. In para 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows:
"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus
standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of
the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to
any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the
threshold."
9. In para 98 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as
follows:
"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis
at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed
doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of
severe warning that Courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere
busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener
without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or
other oblique consideration."
10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:
"It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient
interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi and can
approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from
violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or
private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a
vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the Court for
vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".
11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings
initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise
could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants.
Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of
PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the
oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated
and whose grievance go unnoticed, unrepresented and un-headed; yet we cannot
avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate
grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of
millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons
sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to
life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering
from undue delay in service matters government or private, persons awaiting
the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or
unauthorised collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their
release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long
serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and
having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers,
wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest
except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy
of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity
break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest
litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexations and frivolous petitions
of luxury litigants who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing
and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of
which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which
piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great
care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see
that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice,
vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as
an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the
citizens. The attractive brand ‘name of public interest litigation school not
be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed
at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity
oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be
careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the
court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or
political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow
its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who
moniter at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the
pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from
improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich
themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap
popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by
rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford foundation in USA
defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law,
USA, 1976 as follows:
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to effects
provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests.
Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market
place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant
segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and
interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic
minorities and others."
14. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant;
(b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the
information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show
gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two
conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and
reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance
of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for
oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the
Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that
under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon
the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.
The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies
or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They
masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro
Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own
to protect.
15. Court must be justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from
crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where
necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against
the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu.
(1994 (2) SCC 481), and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation vs. M/s BAR
Re-Rolling Mills and Anr. (AIR 1994 SC 2151). No litigant has a right to
unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his
affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not
be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (See Dr.
B.K. Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1976) 7 JT 265). Today people rush to
Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public
interest. Self styled saviours who have no face or ground in the midst of
public at large, of late, try to use such litigations to keep themselves busy
and their names in circulation, despite having really become defunct in actual
public life and try to smear and smirch and solemnity of court proceedings.
They must really inspire confidence in Courts and among the public, failing
which such litigation should be axed with heavy hand and dire consequences.
16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though
titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is
shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public
interest litigations, whereas only a minuscule percentage can legitimately be
called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public
interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of
cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Court at times are
entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted
above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in
Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC
114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained,
the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in
the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do
is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. This tendency is being
slowly permitted to percolate for setting in motion criminal law jurisdiction,
often unjustifiable just for gaining publicity and giving adverse publicity to
their opponents. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official
documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner
came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer
that given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the
road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of
the official documents. Apart from the sinister manner, if any, of getting
such copters, the real brain or force behind such cases would get exposed to
find out whether it was a bona fide venture. Whenever such frivolous pleas are
taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the
petitions but also to impose exemplary costs, as it prima facie gives
impression about oblique motives involved, and in most cases show proxy
litigation. Where the petitioner has not even a remote link with the issues
involved, it becomes imperative for the Court to lift the veil and uncover the
real purpose of the petition and the real person behind it. It would be
desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss
them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right
direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of
the Courts.
17. In S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India and Anr. (1981 Supp SCC 87) it was
emphatically pointed out that the relaxation of the rule of locus standi in
the field of PIL does not give any right to a busybody or meddlesome
interloper to approach the Court under the guise of a public interest
litigant. The following notes of caution was given; (SCC p. 219, para 24).
"But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches
the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain
or private profit of political motivation of other oblique consideration. The
court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to
delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective."
18. In State of H.P. vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and
Ors. (1985 (3) SCC 169), it has been said that public interest litigation is a
weapon which has to be used with great care and ‘.
19. Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in Sachidanand Pandey
vs. State of W.B. (1987 (2) SCC 295, 331) said:
"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion
under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among
the public. They must be above suspicion. (SCC p. 331, para 46).
***
Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that
it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without
any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines
and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If
courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public
interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of
law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves
administrative and executive functions. (SCC p. 334, para 59).
***
I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But
this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to
walk in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public
interest litigants." (SCC p. 335 para 61)
20. These aspects have been highlighted in Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. The State of
West Bengal (2003 (8) Supreme 299).
21. Procedure for appointment of a Judge is provided in Article 217 of the
Constitution. The process is an elaborate one and involves the views of the
collegium of the Court. Where a particular person is to be appointed as a
Judge, the modalities and procedures to be adopted have been elaborately dealt
with in Special Reference No. 1 o 1998, Re: (1998 (7) SCC 739). The scope of
judicial review has been specifically delienated, limiting it to want of
consultation with the named constitutional functionaries or lack or any
condition of eligibility and not on any other ground including that of bias
which is in any case is excluded by the element of plurality in the process of
decision-making. The view in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and
Ors. vs. Union of India 1993 (4) SCC (popularly known as Second Judges’ case)
was reiterated. It would be proper to take not of very significant
observations made in the Second Judges’ case about the growing tendency of
needless intrusion by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the
judiciary under the garb of public interest litigation, in spite of the
caution in S.P. Gupta’s case (supra). The note of caution has yielded no
fruitful result and on the contrary these busybodies continue to make reckless
allegations and vitriolic statements against Judges and persons whose names
are under consideration for judgeship Therefore, it has become imperative to
take stern actions against these persons. It is not the ipse dixit of any
individual to say as to whether the recommended person is fit for appointment,
by making wide allegations which has become common these days and have
resulted in delaying appointment of Judges, though large number of vacancies
exist in different High Courts. All possible care and caution is exercised
before appointment of a Judge is made. It is true that no system is
infallible, but at the same time the sinister design of people intended to
thwart prospects of a person likely to be appointed as a Judge has to be
nipped at the bud. The petitioner has not shown any material to show that he
is really interested in the welfare of the judicial system or the institution
of the judiciary. As indicated above, he appears to be a busy person seeking
publicity and a person who has no genuine concern for the institution, if such
type of petitions are permitted to be entertained it will cause immense damage
to the system itself. High sounding words used in the petition about the
desirability of a transparent judicial system cannot in our view turn a mis-conceived
petition filed with oblique motives to be treated as a public interest
litigation. This petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs and we
direct so. The petition though deserves to be dismissed with costs of Rs.
50,000/- hoping that the petitioner would mend his ways and would not hazard
such vexatious litigations in future dismiss the same with costs of Rs.
10,000/- which the petitioner shall deposit in the Registry of this Court with
6 weeks from today. If deposit is made it shall be remitted to the Supreme
Court Legal Services Authority. In case the cost is not deposited within the
time stipulated, the Registry shall forward this order to the Punjab and
Haryana High Court and the High Court shall have it recovered by coercive
means of recovery and remit the same to this Court, which on receipt shall be
paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority.